THE POLITICS OF COUNCIL HOUSING FINANCE

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1. The Conservative Government and Council Housing Finance

The recently published Green Paper on Public Expenditure and Taxation[1] revealed quite clearly that council housing has borne the brunt of the Government's policy of cutting public expenditure. Public housing has been a central target in the attempt to roll back the state. There are several reasons why this should be so.

First of all, although the overall thrust of Conservative policy was to reduce public spending and taxation, several key areas of expenditure were not only exempt from such cuts, but intended to grow. The best examples are defence, with the commitment to grow by 3% per annum in real terms to reach the NATO average, and law and order. Health spending was to be maintained broadly in line with Labour's plans. With the rapid rise in unemployment, social security spending was to grow quite rapidly.

The end result in 1983, after the first term of the Thatcher Administration, was that local government and public housing had been the main target for spending cuts, and whilst local authorities had been successful in resisting the cuts in rate support grant, dramatic cuts in public expenditure on housing had been achieved (see Table 1).

Secondly, housing was also central to the Government's new vision of local democracy. Distrust of 'local corporatism' had resulted in a changed view of the virtues of local government as an institution, and an increased emphasis on individual rights.[2] Whilst the Tenants' Rights (Scotland) Act in many aspects fulfilled the policy aims of the previous Labour Government, the sale of council houses through the statutory right to buy

(see David Alexander's article) was symptomatic of the new approach. Apart from the traditional Conservative vision of a property-owning democracy and the virtues of home ownership, there was the realisation that the propensity to vote Conservative was greater amongst working-class owner-occupiers than working-class council tenants.[3]

Table 1

Changes in Cost Terms in Government Expenditure Programmes since 1978-79

Defence	+23%
Agriculture, Fisheries, Food and Forestry	+40%
Law and Order	+33%
Health and Person Social Services	+16%
Social Security	+26%
Local Authorities	+10%
Trade and Industry	−29%
Public Housing	−34%

Thirdly, the nature of the council housing programme makes it administratively and politically convenient to cut. The growing literature on cutback management reveals the dominance of two strategies for coping with retrenchment and fiscal pressure. One is to increase income from other sources (charging) and the other is to cut capital expenditure, as it has less short-term consequences for the organisation. Housing was a suitable subject for such strategies. A large proportion of the public spending programme was on capital, and a major alternative source of income was available, namely council rents. We can expose these ideas further by examining the framework of council housing finance.

Control of housing capital expenditure in Scotland is effected through the Housing Plan system, and Section 94 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. The Government determines the overall resources available for housing and these are divided into two blocks, the housing revenue account (the HRA Block), which covers expenditure on council housing, and the non-housing revenue account (the non-HRA Block), which covers aid tothe private sector in the form of improvement grants and lending for house purchase and improvement. Local authorities have the power to transfer up to 10% of their allocations between blocks (*virement*), thus providing some flexibility for managing programmes. I have written elsewhere that this system has increased the degree of managerial freedom, whilst assisting in greater central control over expenditure.[4]

Scotland's heavy dependence on council housing has led to the programme forming a separate part of the accounts of District and Islands

Councils, unlike England and Wales where it is part of the Block Grant.[5] Revenue expenditure consists of *repairs and maintenance, administration and management,* and redemption and interest payments. Income arises from three main sources, government grant (Housing Support Grant), rents and contributions from rates. The HSG is related to the expenditure and rental income of each authority's Housing Revenue Account. It was introduced in 1979, with the declared intention of concentrating Housing Subsidies where the need was greatest. The Secretary of State estimates for each authority, the amount of (a) Eligible Expenditure and (b) Relevant Income. Eligible expenditure consists of

- annual loan charges reflecting the consequences of past capital expenditure;

- a standard amount per council house for management and maintenance expenditure together with specific weightings in respect of numbers of high rise dwellings in urban areas and in respect of the first 8,500 houses in the housing stock, and

- other expenditure.

Relevant Income comprises

- Standard Rents, that is rents before the deduction of any rebates granted;

- Rate Fund Contributions;

- Other income.

In assessing relevant income, the Secretary of State determines what he considers authorities can reasonably derive from rents and Rate Fund Contributions. The aggregate amount of the Housing Support Grant is the difference between Eligible Expenditure and Relevant Income. Concern to control all housing public expenditure, irrespective of its source of finance, and the treatment of housing as a separately financed service, has allowed the Government to link expenditure on capital with revenue, through the Housing Expenditure Limit system, in a way which is not possible with the Rate Support Grant. The scope for local discretion stems from the Rate Fund Contribution. The thrust of Government policy has been to reduce grants and ensure matching increases in rents, whilst maintaining the current level of Rate Fund Contribution. The HEL system operates so that any expenditure incurred via the Rate Fund Contribution in excess of government plans results in off- setting reductions in capital expenditure, whereby total public expenditure on housing is contained within the planned figure in the Public Expenditure Survey.

In practice, these mechanisms have allowed substantial reductions in the council housing expenditure programme, and also a change in priorities from public to private sector housing. Overall, the cut in capital expenditure between 1979 and 1983 was 33%.

Table 2

Capital Expenditure on Housing by Local Authorities (1979-83)
(1983 prices*)

*These figures have been recalculated using the retail price index.

	1979	1983	% Change
Housing Improvement and Standard Grants	£31.4m	£114.6m	+364%
HRA	£445.5m	£267.5m	– 40%
Loans	£43.4m	£29.3m	– 33%
Other Housing	£21.4m	£9.9m	– 54%
Total	£541.7m	£421.3m	– 33%

Source: Rating Review

The bulk of the reductions were in the HRA account, whilst grants to the private sector grew rapidly. (This was halted because of public expenditure pressures in 1984.) Table 3 reveals the extent to which spending priorities changed.

Table 3

Changing Priorities in Housing Capital Expenditure

	1979	1983
Housing Improvement and Standard Grants	5.7%	27.2%
HRA	82.2%	63.5%
Loans	8.0%	6.9%
Other Housing	4.1%	2.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Rating Review

The Government became sensitive to the impact of cutting capital expenditure on the construction industry, and in fact in 1983-84 a modest growth of 2% occurred over 1982-83, mainly in the HRA account. This was however the year of the General Election. The latest White Paper projections suggest a fall in capital expenditure of 2-3% in 1984-5.[6]

It is commonplace to equate cuts in expenditure with cuts in services. This is problematic in the analysis of council housing expenditure, and it is necessary to make a clearer distinction between the expenditure decisions of local authorities,and financing decisions.

It was noted earlier that there are three key sources of expenditure, loan charges, supervision and management, and repairs and maintenance. Two significant changes took place in the period 1979-83. First, the level of expenditure on loan charges dropped dramatically, by 23.8% in real terms. This is attributable to two factors, the policy of council house sales leading to debt redemption, and the favourable fall in interest rates since 1982. Secondly, however, expenditure on the other two elements in the equation has *risen* marginally in real terms.

Table 4

Housing Revenue Account Expenditure 1979-1983 (1983 prices)

	1979	1983	% Change
Loan Charges	£574.4m	£438.3m	−23.8%
Supervision and Management	£69.7m	£77.5m	+11.0%
Repairs and Maintenance	£191.1m	£198.5m	+ 3.8%
Total	£835.5m	£714.3m	−11.4%

Source: Rating Review

This is interesting, because the two elements which have grown are areas where there is much greater scope for local discretion. Therefore, although housing has borne the brunt of cuts in public spending, local authorities have increased *gross* revenue expenditure in areas under their control.

Turning to the financing decisions, we find that even more dramatic changes have taken place. Government has always been able to impose expenditure reductions by reducing funding, but seldom can there have been such a dramatic reduction in government support for a programme. The thrust of government policy was that reduction in HSG should be compensated for by increased rents. This policy has been reasonably successful. Whilst HSG has been cut by 72.1% in real terms, income from rents has rised by 25.7%, whilst the real increase in spending from the Rate Fund Contributions is a mere 6.0%. This resulted in a dramatic shift in the sources of funding council housing, as revealed in Table 5 below. The percentage of expenditure funded by rents has consistently grown, the percentage funded by HSG has consistently fallen, and the percentage

funded by the Rate Fund Contribution has risen marginally.

Table 5

Financing of Council Housing

Year	Percentage Funded by		
	Rents	HSG	RFC
1979-80	47	39	14
1980-81	50	37	13
1981-82	59	25	16
1982-83	66	16	18
1983-84	71	11	18

Source: COSLA – Rate Support Grant and Housing Support Grant Scotland 1984-85.

By 1983, the Government could be well pleased with its progress towards its objectives in council housing finance.

2. Local Authority Responses

Decisions on financing council housing have long been a key issue which divides political parties. They represent explicit articulation of social and political values. In general, the Conservative Party is seen as the party of the owner-occupier and the small businessman. In housing finance, they exhibit a concern to protect the interest of the domestic and commercial ratepayer by limiting susidies to the Housing Revenue Account through the Rate Fund Contribution, whilst seeking to achieve 'economic' rents, i.e. higher and less subsidised than those which existed in 1979. As we have seen, this was reflected in Government policy since 1979.

The Labour Party is likewise seen as protecting special interests, i.e.those of the working-class council tenant. Council housing is seen as a low cost, equitable means of ensuring basic housing needs are met, and subsidies both via HSG and the Rate Fund Contribution are regarded as legitimate ways of redistributing wealth and providing good housing at a 'price people can afford'. In government from 1974-79, the Labour Government increased subsidies, and froze and then controlled rent increases. In the main, reliance was placed on central grants for subsidising the cost of council housing.

The question now is, is this basic partisan divide reflected at the local level? There are problems of analysis at this level, particularly the small number of Conservative councils, which requires careful consideration before generalisation can be justified. Moreover, there are a large number of Independent councils in Scotland, which it would be wrong to categorise as 'Conservative', but which can generally be regarded as 'non Socialist'.

In 1980, the Labour Party made sweeping gains in the local elections, winning control of twenty councils and retaining power of the six already under Labour control. The Conservatives lost overall control in two authorities, and outright control in one authority. The rural areas remained Independent. This permits some useful analysis of the impact of change in political control on council housing finance.

First of all, we can examine the issue in absolute terms. In Appendix One, the authorities with the highest levels of expenditure, and highest levels of grant, rental and rate fund income per house are listed. In terms of expenditure and grants, these are dominated by rural councils in Northern Scotland, where high building costs in areas of acute sparsity lead to higher spending, and therefore, higher grant.This is unaffected by the change of government in 1979. In each case, nine of the ten high spenders are high grant receivers in 1983 as in 1979. Berwickshire (Conservative controlled) is the only non-Independent council in this group.

High expenditure per house was also reflected in high rents per house in 1979. Five of the authorities who had the highest expenditure also had higher rents. Of the other five authorities, three were from the *lower* cost southern rural areas, one was Conservative controlled Edinburgh, and one was Liberal controlled Inverclyde. By 1983, considerable changes took place. Only five of the high rents councils were still in the group. Two rural councils in southern Scotland had entered the group, one northern rural council, and one Conservative and one Labour council.

Similar changes are recorded in terms of Rate Fund Contributions. In 1979, six of the ten authorities with high RFCs were northern Independent councils. By 1983, this had fallen to two councils. In 1979, two Labour and two Conservative councils also had high RFCs. By 1983, *seven* Labour councils were in the group, and only one Conservative council (Bearsden).

We can also examine this in relative terms. Local authorities operate within a framework of constrained choice. The theory of incrementalism suggests that part of those constraints is historic expenditure patterns.[(7)] But incrementalism has been shaped and developed in a period of growth. Cutback management in areas of financing rather than service provision, can result in relatively non-incremental charges. Until 1979, a relatively high and stable level of grant led to a more uniform pattern of housing finance. The abrupt and rapid erosion of Housing Support Grant [(8)] created environmental turbulence with key financing decisions to be taken locally which can be interpreted as reflecting local political choice.

Table 6 sets out the figures. I have included a *Labour Gains '80* category as it is change of control which past research suggests leads to changes of priorities and expenditure.[(9)] The figures are the average for the different categories.

Table 6

Financing of HRA Expenditure

Political Control	1979 Rents %	1979 Grant %	1979 RFC %	1983 Rents %	1983 Grant %	1983 RFC %
Conservative	50	35	14	86	5	9
Labour	48	33	19	76	4	20
Labour Gains '80	49	34	17	70	5	25
Independent	42	42	16	64	29	6
Scotland	47	39	14	71	11	18

There are several interesting trends. In partisan councils,the erosion of Housing Support Grant was most extreme. In Conservative controlled councils, there was a drop in the percentage funded by RFC from 13.6% to 10%, at a time when one might have expected it to increase. However, this conceals the variations in performance. Three of the five Conservative controlled councils eliminated their RFCs completely, and one reduced it drastically. The average is raised by Bearsden, who *increased* the RFC considerably. Moreover, in the two councils where the Conservatives lost control in 1980 (Angus and Edinburgh) RFC also rose. But the overall trend is clear. *Conservative councils reduced public subsidies through the RFC and increased rents,* in the latter case more than any other political groupings.

The opposite pattern is found in councils controlled by the Labour Party. Having fought the elections in 1980 on the basis 'Protect Yourself – Vote Labour', the most visible form of protection is to pass cuts in grant onto the rates rather than rents, as industrial and commercial rates contributes a majority of rateable income (56% in 1981-82). Thus the subsidy to council housing is drawn from private house owners and the business community, and council tenants are net beneficiaries.

Whilst as we have seen overall, Labour councils made increasing use of Rate Fund subsidies to compensate for loss in grant, considerable rent increases were still required, and considerable variation also occurred. In

Table 7

Changes in Council Housing Finance in Conservative Controlled Councils 1979-1983

	Rents % change	RFC % change	HSG % change
Perth	+44	Nil	−44
NE Fife	+39	− 8	−31
Berwickshire	+28	− 8	−20
Bearsden	+24	+ 5	−20
Eastwood	+44	−27	−17
Angus*	+37	+ 5	−42
Edinburgh*	+24	+ 9	−33

* Denotes minority administration from 1980.

1980, for instance, substantial increases in Rate Fund Contributions occurred in Dundee, where the Labour Party had promised a rent freeze, and in Stirling, where the RFC was already quite high. The most significant increases in RFCs were found in authorities where Labour gained outright control (e.g. Dundee, Cumbernauld, Renfrew, Inverclyde, Cunninghame, and Kyle and Carrick). These changes are recorded in Table 8, where the general trend is clearer. *Twenty of the twenty-five councils controlled by the Labour Party increased the RFC subsidy* to protect tenants from increases in rents caused by the *reductions in grants.*

The final group for analysis is Independent councils. These were most protected from cuts in grant, but we find two significant behaviour patterns occurring. In almost all councils, there was a tendency to *reduce* the *percentage* of finance provided by the rates, and secondly, the *extent* of the subsidy was much higher in district councils in the Highland Region than those in Borders, Dumfries and Grampian Regions. In general, councils facing the most severe grant loss incurred the greatest *increases* in rental income, with Lochaber, Inverness, Badenoch and Strathspey, and Nithsdale Districts providing spectacular exceptions to the rule.

The period 1979-83 was one of great turbulence in housing finance. It followed a period of stability, when increases in grant and a system of rent controls resulted in relatively common patterns in council housing finance. The Conservative Government's policy has been largely successful, but there have been diverse political responses locally. The Government argued that Rate Fund Contribution should remain stable. In fact, these have grown slightly, because Labour councils overwhelmingly refused to pass on the full impact of cuts in grant to council tenants. Two distinct patterns of response emerged. In Labour councils, the general response is

Table 8

Changes in Council Housing Finance in Labour Controlled Councils 1979-1983

	Rents % change	RFC % change	HSG % change
Aberdeen	+26	+ 7	−34
Dundee	+12	+19	−31
Kirkcaldy	+32	+ 8	−40
Dunfermline	+38	− 1	−37
West Lothian	+39	− 6	−33
Midlothian	+30	+ 6	−36
East Lothian	+30	+ 5	−35
Clackmannan	+26	+ 7	−33
Stirling	+15	+ 6	−21
Falkirk	+35	+ 4	−39
Dumbarton	+25	+ 8	−33
Glasgow	+13	− 3	−10
Clydebank	+22	No change	−22
Strathkelvin	+24	+ 4	−28
Cumbernauld	+13	+13	−26
Monklands	+22	− 7	−15
Motherwell	+22	+ 6	−28
Hamilton	+27	+ 1	−28
East Kilbride	+23	+ 6	−29
Renfrew	+18	+11	−29
Inverclyde	+10	+16	−26
Cunninghame	+15	+15	−30
Kilmarnock and Loudon	+20	+12	−32
Kyle and Carrick	+18	+17	−35
Cumnock and Doon Valley	+29	+ 4	−33

to *increase* Rate Fund Contributions and limit rent increase, in other councils, the opposite practice is found – rents are increased and Rate Fund Contributions limited. The traditional political divide emerges as a key factor in council housing finance.

3. Whither Now for Council Housing Finance?

At the time of writing (June 1984) further changes in housing finance are in the offing. First of all, the public expenditure projections suggest a

Table 9

Changes in Council Housing Finance in Independent Councils 1979-1983

	Rents % change	RFC % change	HSG % change
Caithness	+22	−10	−12
Sutherland	+21	− 7	−14
Ross and Cromarty	+21	−17	− 4
Skye and Lochalsh	+13	− 8	− 1
Lochaber	+20	− 4	−16
Inverness	+10	+12	−22
Badenoch and Strathspey	+21	−25	+ 4
Nairn	+13	− 2	−11
Moray	+31	−10	−21
Banff and Buchan	+32	− 5	−27
Gordon	+23	− 3	−20
Kincardine	+20	− 3	−17
Tweedale	+49	−16	−31
Ettrick	+37	− 5	−32
Roxburgh	+24	−12	−12
Wigtown	+33	− 5	−28
Stewartry	+23	− 6	−17
Nithsdale	+26	+ 7	−33
Annandale	+ 4	− 9	− 5

continuing decline in public expenditure on housing,(10) although the decline of capital expenditure is to be halted. This leaves two sources of target, Housing Support Grant (52.5m in 1984) and Rate Fund Contribution (143m in 1983). At the moment, Government plans for public spending over the next five years assume that overall it will remain broadly stable, but that economic growth will allow tax cuts in later years. However, that is based on a series of optimistic assumptions about the economy.(11) If these do not materialise, further pressure on public programmes will become necessary, and housing will be an obvious target.

This brings us to our second change. The Housing Expenditure Limit has proved successful in (a) controlling total expenditure on housing and (b) directing authorities towards rent increases. A recent Scottish Office document spells out the proposed changes thus.

'The HEL system has not however halted the overall trend for RFCs to increase, because a number of authorities have budgeted for RFCs in excess of the limits specified by the Government. This has led to reductions in capital allocations which would otherwise have been given on the HRA block amounting to 38.5m in 1981-82, 51.6m in 1982-83, and 13.5m in 1983-84.

The Government therefore propose to replace the HEL system with a new system which will have statutory backing. Under this new system, the Government will set statutory limits to the contributions which local authorities may make from their rate funds to housing. This will enable greater accuracy in planning the component parts of housing public expenditure. ...'

The Thatcher Government has developed a great skill in presenting major changes in the constitutional rights of local authorities as minor administrative changes. This legislation is in fact a major change in the principles on which council housing has been conducted in this country, namely that council house rent levels should be decided locally. The democratic implications of the policy are clear enough – Central Government will decide how much each locality may subsidise its council housing programme – effectively nullifying the effect of the electoral process on what is in effect one of the three or four major strategic decisions a local authority takes. Unfortunately, the implications of this change have been overshadowed by the proposals for rate-capping, but there can be no doubt that it constitutes a major change in central-local relationships in housing.

So what does this mean for council housing? It means the future is highly uncertain. If the Treasury's optimistic assumptions fail to materialise, and further reductions in spending are sought, there is a limit to how far further savings can be attained in capital spending or Housing Support Grant. Already, 58% of the housing stock get no grant. Cuts in grant would fall in future on authorities with high costs, the rural authorities, or Glasgow. What is more likely is that the RFC will become the target. Cuts would then be concentrated on Labour councils, with little political repercussions for the Government. The implications for housing policy will be discussed by David Alexander. The thrust of the Government's financing policy has been a radical change in the structure of housing finance. Its council house sales policy has not changed dramatically the amount of Scots living in council housing. In 1979, local authorities owned 892,000 houses. In 1983, they still owned 875,000. Those on low incomes excepted, the high rent increases of recent years (growth of 25% in real terms) seem likely to continue, but their capacity to resist and influence those increases will be greatly reduced by the new legislation. The danger for the Government is of creating Clay Cross style situations for the most spurious of reasons. The small increase in Rate Fund Contributions cannot be seriously regarded as hindering public expenditure planning or macro-economic management. The new legislation is quite capable of producing political martyrs who will be able to point to the undemocratic nature of Government action. It will require quite sensitive political management by the Government to avoid scoring own goals.

APPENDIX ONE

Council Housing Finance

(a) Highest Expenditure

1979	1983
Ross and Cromarty (I)	Skye and Lochalsh (I)
Lochaber (I)	Lochaber (I)
Skye and Lochalsh (I)	Ross and Cromarty (I)
Inverness (I)	Badenoch and Strathspey (I(
Argyll and Bute (I)	Argyll (I)
Badenoch and Strathspey (I)	Gordon (I)
Sutherland (I)	Annandale and Eskdale (I)
Berwickshire (I)	Nairn (I)
Gordon (I)	Sutherland (I)
Moray (I)	Inverness (I)

(b) Highest Levels of HSG

1979	1983
Ross and Cromarty (I)	Ross and Cromarty (I)
Lochaber (I)	Badenoch and Strathspey (I)
Skye and Lochalsh (I)	Skye and Lochalsh (I)
Berwickshire (C)	Lochaber (I)
Gordon (I)	Annandale and Eskdale (I)
Argyll (I)	Argyll (I)
Sutherland (I)	Gordon (I)
Kincardine (I)	Kincardine (I)
Banff and Buchan (I)	Sutherland (I)
Badenoch and Strathspey (I)	Nairn (I)

(c) Highest Rental Income per House

1979	1983
Edinburgh (C)	Argyll (I)
Inverness (I)	Roxburgh (I)
Berwickshire (C)	NE Fife (C)
Inverclyde (Lib)	Stewartry (I)
Sutherland (I)	Edinburgh (C)
Ettrick and Lauderdale (I)	Wigtown (I)
Roxburgh (I)	Dunfermline (Lab)
Moray (I)	Berwickshire (C)
Annandale (I)	Annandale and Eskdale (I)
Argyll (I)	Badenoch and Strathspey (I)

(d) Highest RFC per House

1979	1983
Skye and Lochalsh (I)	Bearsden (C)
Eastwood (C)	Stirling (Lab)
Badenoch and Strathspey (I)	East Kilbride (Lab)
Ross and Cromarty (I)	Aberdeen (Lab)
Lochaber (I)	Lochaber (I)
Bearsden (C)	Skye and Lochalsh (I)
Argyll (I)	Hamilton (Lab)
Hamilton (Lab)	Cumbernauld and Kilsyth (Lab)
Glasgow (Lab)	Strathkelvin (Lab)
Sutherland (I)	Dumbarton (Lab)

(I) denotes Independent
(Lib) denotes Liberal
(C) denotes Conservative
(Lab) denotes Labour

APPENDIX TWO

The Pattern of Council Housing Finance

Authority	1979-80 Rents	1979-80 HSG	1979-80 RFC	1983-84 Rents	1983-84 HSG	1983-84 RFC
Berwickshire	44	48	8	72	28	0
Ettrick and Lauderdale	51	44	5	88	12	0
Roxburgh	51	36	13	75	24	1
Tweedale	52	31	17	99	0	1
Clackmannan	54	34	12	80	1	19
Falkirk	45	39	16	80	0	20
Stirling	53	21	26	58	0	32
Annandale	49	37	14	53	32	5
Nithsdale	66	33	1	92	0	8
Stewartry	54	36	10	77	19	4
Wigtown	59	36	5	92	8	0
Dunfermline	49	37	14	87	0	13
Kirkcaldy	57	40	3	89	0	11
North East Fife	55	37	8	94	6	0
Aberdeen	46	38	16	56	14	30
Banff	42	52	6	74	25	1
Gordon	37	49	14	60	29	11
Kincardine	43	48	9	53	31	6
Moray	44	46	10	75	25	0
Badenoch	34	38	28	55	42	3
Caithness	41	38	21	63	26	11
Inverness	51	42	7	61	20	19
Lochaber	29	49	22	49	33	18
Nairn	47	36	17	60	25	15
Ross and Cromarty	30	49	21	51	45	4
Skye and Lochalsh	34	37	29	47	36	17
Sutherland	40	42	18	61	28	11
Argyll	38	41	21	69	29	2
Bearsden	44	29	27	68	0	32
Clydebank	40	42	18	62	20	18
Clydesdale	51	33	6	89	0	11
Cumbernauld	58	26	16	71	0	29
Cumnock	51	33	16	80	0	20
Cunninghame	56	30	14	71	0	29
Dumbarton	44	33	23	69	0	31

Authority	1979-80 Rents	1979-80 HSG	1979-80 RFC	1983-84 Rents	1983-84 HSG	1983-84 RFC
East Kilbride	49	29	22	72	0	28
Eastwood	43	17	40	87	0	13
Glasgow	44	31	25	57	21	22
Hamilton	42	29	29	69	1	30
Inverclyde	53	38	9	63	12	25
Kilmarnock	55	32	13	75	0	25
Kyle and Carrick	56	42	2	74	7	19
Monklands	49	24	27	71	9	20
Motherwell	47	32	21	69	4	27
Renfrew	52	29	19	70	0	30
Strathkelvin	45	32	23	69	4	27
Angus	55	44	1	92	2	6
Dundee	59	31	10	71	–	29
Perth	56	44	0	100	–	–
Edinburgh	62	33	5	86	0	14
East Lothian	50	45	5	80	10	10
Midlothian	50	36	14	80	0	20
West Lothian	47	33	20	86	0	14
Scotland	47	39	14	71	11	18

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